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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  the  post-9/11  and  post-Katrina  era,  society  is  once  again  reminded  of  its 
vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters.  Social preparedness for the next possible 
disasters is a pressing concern, and the demand and pressure for emergency management 
planning are heightened.  Outbreaks of exotic contagious diseases, whether for humans, 
animals, or plants, are potential disasters that call for emergency management planning.  
For example, arrival in the US of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is inevitable 
and only a matter of time.  While timely policy implementation is crucial for effective 
control of such diseases, physical and human capacities would largely determine the scale, 
scope, and effectiveness of disease control actions during an outbreak.  Early disease 
detection by surveillance activities would also limit the size and the damage of outbreaks, 
especially in case of fast-spreading diseases. 
An important economic question is: what is a desirable way for a society to be 
prepared  for  potential  outbreaks?    More  specifically,  what  is  the  efficient  way  of 
allocating limited resources to alternative preparation and investment areas?  In this study, 
we  address  the  question  in  the  context  of  a  potential  foot-and-mouth  disease  (FMD) 
outbreak, a highly contagious animal disease, exotic to the US, and whose economic 
consequences  could  be  substantial  and  extensive  (Ekboir,  1999;  Paarlberg,  Lee,  and 
Seitzinger,  2003).    We  consider  specific  investment  areas  of  surveillance,  carcass   3 
disposal capacity, and vaccine stockpile, and analyze their impacts on disease control 
strategies during an outbreak.
1 
In analyzing FMD preparation decisions, we use a dynamic optimization model of 
FMD management developed previously (Kobayashi et al., a).  The model minimizes 
total regional outbreak cost by choosing herd depopulation and vaccination strategies, 
given epidemiologic relationships of dynamic disease spread and constraints on disease 
control  capacity.    With  this  model,  it  is  possible  to  evaluate  different  preparation 
strategies when the resources are optimally utilized during an outbreak.  Similar analyses 
can be conducted using epidemiologic simulation models, but the results, though possibly 
based on more detailed epidemiologic specifications, lack reference to optimality. 
The optimal FMD management model is parameterized for a three-county region 
in the Central Valley of California (Fresno, Kings, and Tulare counties) (Kobayashi et al., 
a).  The region is characterized by a concentration of large-scale dairy operations.  With 
frequent movements of animals, vehicles, and personnel to and from these farms, FMD, 
should it enter the region, is expected to spread quickly among the dairy farms (Bates, 
Thurmond, and Carpenter, 2001).  Given the high asset values of dairy cattle and the 
importance  of  dairy  production  in  the  region,
2 an  FMD  outbreak  would  result  in  a 
substantial  damage  to  the  local  economy  (Ekboir,  1999;  Kobayashi  et  al.,  b).  
Accordingly, local FMD-control planning gives special attention to the dairy operations 
in  the  region  (Dr.  Richard  Breitmeyer,  California  State  Veterinarian,  personal 
                                                 
1 Disease prevention efforts, intended to reduce the probability of an exotic disease entering the system (e.g. 
border  control  and  on-farm  bio-security  measures),  are  also  an  important  investment  area  and  pose 
substitutability with investments in surveillance and control capacities.  However, for the purpose of this 
study, we focus on the types of preparation investment that are expected to limit the extent of an outbreak 
once it has occurred. 
2 Milk production represents about 20% of the region’s gross agricultural output (30% if cattle and calves 
are included).  Dairy farms are the major suppliers of calves and cull-cows for beef production in the region.   4 
communication).  Using the model, we find that targeted surveillance on sales yards (and 
possibly dairy farms) would supplement the insufficient carcass disposal capacity in this 
region, as outbreaks starting on these operation types are expected to expand quickly and 
widely and the benefits of early disease detection would be significant. 
2.  MANAGING AN FMD OUTBREAK IN THE US 
2.1 FMD DISEASE DYNAMICS AND CONTROL OPTIONS 
FMD affects cloven-hoofed animals, such as cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer, 
but not humans.  Introduced into a livestock herd, mortality is typically limited to young 
animals,  while  mature  animals  usually  recover  from  the  disease  without  intervention, 
though the productivity would be reduced by at least 25% (Hyslop, 1970).  Since FMD is 
extremely  contagious,  the  national  interest  would  be  to  quickly  contain  an  outbreak 
before it spreads extensively within the country.  A country exporting FMD-susceptible 
livestock and livestock products would also have a strong incentive for quick control, as 
importers would typically halt importation of such products from countries with FMD 
outbreaks.    Furthermore,  FMD-endemic  countries  are  differentiated  in  international 
markets from FMD-free countries even without recent outbreaks (OIE, 2005).  Thus, in 
order  to  avoid  protracted  trade  restrictions,  a  previously  FMD-free  country  would 
typically  take  an  eradication  approach  to  controlling  an  FMD  outbreak,  primarily  by 
depopulating infected herds. 
FMD spreads mostly through direct and indirect contacts between infectious and 
susceptible animals.
3  Besides intentional dissemination, direct animal contacts are the 
most infectious mode of FMD virus dissemination, and such contacts may occur among 
                                                 
3 Airborne disease transmission is also possible but relatively unimportant.  In the 2001 UK outbreak, it is 
estimated that about 1% of the cases was through airborne transmission (Gibbens et al., 2001).   5 
animals in a herd, at sales yards, or through shipments of animals to other herds.  Indirect 
contacts involve other vectors such as people, vehicles, and equipment.  For example, a 
veterinarian or a feed truck may stop at multiple farms in a day, potentially carrying FMD 
viruses from one farm to another.  As soon as FMD is detected, therefore, movement 
restrictions  on  animals,  people,  vehicles,  and  other  potential  vectors  of  disease 
transmission  would  be  imposed  in  order  to  limit  the  number  of  direct  and  indirect 
contacts and the further disease spread. 
One factor that complicates FMD management is that the disease may be difficult 
to detect and a delay in control policy implementation is almost inevitable.  An animal 
infected by FMD virus would become infectious after a few days (latent period), but 
clinical  signs,  if  any,  would  appear  after  another  few  days  (subclinically-infectious 
period).  Moreover, clinical signs on an individual animal can be subtle and may not be 
noticed  immediately.    The  clinical  signs  may  also  be  confused  with  those  of  other 
diseases.    Thus,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  detect  an  FMD-infected  animal  in  its 
earliest stages of infection without specialized diagnostic testing.  Because of its high 
contagiousness, by the time the first case is detected, the disease would likely have spread 
to other animals and to other herds.  For example, in the 2001 FMD outbreak in UK, it is 
estimated that there was about a 21-day lag between the initial infection and confirmation 
of  the  first  case  and  that  the  disease  spread  to  at  least  57  herds  during  this  period 
(Gibbens  and  Wilesmith,  2002).    Early  disease  detection  by  surveillance  activities, 
therefore, is an important investment option in preparation for a potential FMD outbreak. 
Subsequent eradication policy would be applied at the herd level, as removing 
visibly- (i.e. clinically-) infected animals in a herd would be insufficient facing a fast-  6 
spreading FMD.  Depopulation policy would be applied to all herds in which clinically-
infected animals have been found.
4  Additional herds may be preemptively depopulated if 
they are considered potentially (i.e. subclinically) infected.  In the 2001 UK outbreak, 
preemptive depopulation was applied to herds that were contiguous to, or had known 
recent contacts with, confirmed infected herds.  In total, more than 4 million animals 
were slaughtered for disease control purposes,
5 of which about a third was on confirmed 
FMD-infected herds (NAO, 2002). 
Vaccination is also a control option to slow down FMD spread, an option used 
regularly in FMD-endemic countries.  In contrast to herd depopulation, which is intended 
to  contain  further  disease  spread  at  the  source,  vaccination  is  often  used  to  protect 
susceptible  herds  from  getting  infected.    However,  the  current  technology  cannot 
distinguish FMD-infected from FMD-vaccinated animals, and this has implications on 
international trade.  Even after an outbreak is contained, a country that has used FMD 
vaccine  would  be  differentiated  from  countries  without  FMD  vaccination  and  would 
continue  to  face  trade  restrictions.    In  order  to  be  free  of  all  FMD-related  trade 
restrictions, an FMD-free country can officially gain an FMD-free-without-vaccination 
status by slaughtering all FMD-vaccinated animals (Article 2.2.10.7., OIE, 2005).  Thus, 
facing an FMD outbreak, a previously FMD-free country would have the following three 
vaccination  policy  options:  1)  no  vaccination,  2)  vaccination  without  slaughtering 
                                                 
4 Hereafter, we simply denote such herds as “clinically-infected herds.”  Short notations are also applied to 
herds in other disease status: a susceptible herd implies a herd with no infected animals; a latent herd has at 
least one latently-infected animal but no infectious animals; and a subclinically-infectious herd has at least 
one  subclinically-infectious  animal  but  no  clinically-infected  animals.    Note  that  subclinically-infected 
herds include both latent and subclinically-infectious herds. 
5 In addition, 2.3 million animals were slaughtered for animal welfare reasons (NAO, 2002), where the 
inability of marketing output and procuring feeds due to movement restrictions raised the necessity of 
euthanizing such animals.   7 
vaccinated animals (“vaccinate-to-live” policy), and 3) vaccination and then slaughter of 
vaccinated animals (“vaccinate-to-kill” policy). 
Overall effectiveness of FMD control efforts is determined by the combined level 
of the control measures.  While individual measures play different roles, their impacts are 
closely interlinked through disease dynamics.  The dynamics of FMD infection, spread, 
and control in a population of livestock herds may be represented in a set of equations as 
in Table 1 (Kobayashi et al., a).
6  Subscripts i and j on variables and parameters represent 
herd  types  (e.g.  beef,  dairy,  and  swine),  while  all  variables  are  indexed  with  t, 
representing a day.  The notions of prevalence and incidence in epidemiology roughly 
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denote  daily  rates  of  baseline  slaughter  (depopulation  of  clinically-infected  herds), 
preemptive slaughter, and vaccination, respectively.  Note that preemptive slaughter and 
vaccination  are  applied  to  the  total  of  susceptible,  latent,  and  subclinically-infectious 
herds because the status of these herds cannot be identified by the decision makers. 
 
                                                 
6 Actual disease transmission processes may be more realistically characterized with spatially explicit and 
stochastic  representation  as,  for  example,  in  the  FMD  simulation  model  by  Bates,  Thurmond,  and 
Carpenter (2003).  These features are to be incorporated in an optimization model in development.   8 
2.2 ECONOMICS OF FMD CONTROL AND PREPARATION 
An economically efficient combination of FMD control strategies would be one 
that balances its marginal costs and benefits.  The challenge for the decision makers is to 
appropriately define and quantify the costs and benefits of different control strategies so 
that  they  can  be  internalized  in  the  decision-making  process.    However,  the  task  is 
extremely difficult.  On the one hand, the decision makers face complex local disease 
dynamics.  On the other hand, locally-applied FMD control measures could have wider 
impacts,  and  the  tradeoffs  of  alternative  strategies  would  not  necessarily  be 
straightforward.
7  For example, aggressive eradication policy by herd depopulation would 
hurt local livestock industry but reduce the probability that the disease spreads outside the 
region.  Aggressive controls would also shorten outbreak duration and hence the duration 
of trade restrictions.  If the FMD-infected region is a major supplier of livestock output, 
tight  movement  restrictions  on  such  commodities  would  disrupt  the  national 
livestock/food  economy.    A  local  FMD  vaccination  policy  may  also  induce  trade 
restrictions applied at the national level.
8 
Previous  studies  on  FMD  economic  impacts  faced  the  same  difficulty  of 
incorporating  disease  dynamics  and  various  aspects  of  FMD  impacts  in  a  single, 
comprehensive framework.  For example, Paarlberg, Lee, and Seitzinger (2003) measure 
welfare  impacts  of  an  FMD  outbreak  in  the  US  by  incorporating  domestic  and 
                                                 
7 Sumner, Bervejillo, and Jarvis (2005) view a disease-controlled state as a public good, and discuss various 
problems arising in management of infectious diseases from the angle. 
8 An FMD-infected or vaccinated zone can be established within a country if the conditions specified by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health are met (OIE, 2005).  The FMD-free zone will be treated differently 
from the rest of the country.   9 
international
9 market effects, but the assumption on the aggregate supply shock due to an 
FMD outbreak (a million head of cattle slaughtered for FMD control) is exogenously 
given with no reference to disease dynamics. 
Other  FMD  market  impacts  analyses  use  supply  shocks  generated  by 
epidemiological simulation models (Ekboir, 1999; Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003).  The 
simulation models are run under alternative assumptions about disease spread rates and 
disease control strategies, and the impacts of simulated outbreaks on the regional and 
national  economy  are  evaluated  in  a  partial  equilibrium  or  multi-sector  framework.  
While  producing  useful  results,  these  studies  can  characterize  epidemiologic  and 
economic tradeoffs of alternative disease control strategies only for selected scenarios, 
and the number of scenarios examined in each study is typically limited. 
The model by Kobayashi et al. (b), which is used in the present analysis of FMD 
preparation, explicitly incorporates local disease dynamics in an optimization model and 
evaluates  all  possible  combinations  of  control  strategies  simultaneously.    While  this 
model overcomes the limitation of the simulation approach, it does not internalize the 
impacts of local disease control strategies outside the region.  We are not aware of a 
comprehensive  optimization  model  that  internalizes  both  disease  dynamics  and  wider 
market  impacts.    Given  the  difficulties,  we  continue  our  discussions  and  analysis  by 
focusing on tradeoffs at a local level that can be captured by local disease dynamics, 
while acknowledging the limitations of the approach and noting the need for a larger, 
more comprehensive model. 
                                                 
9 The focus is placed on US beef imports, as imported and exported beef are treated as perfect substitutes 
and the US is a net beef importer in this sense.  Thus, the issues of market losses due to FMD-related trade 
restrictions are not examined.   10 
An optimal set of local FMD control strategies may be defined as the one that 
minimizes net costs for the entire outbreak.  Since control strategies on a given day would 
affect the future course of disease spread, decision makers would like to balance the 
overall  benefits  and  costs  of  disease  control  strategies  by  applying  them  timely  and 
effectively.  The scale and the timing of strategies that the decision makers can choose 
each  day,  however,  would  be  restricted  to  a  large  extent  by  the  level  of  preparation 
investment  made  prior  to  the  outbreak.    Capacity  constraints  would  have  a  greater 
significance  for  the  control  of  highly  contagious  exotic  diseases  such  as  FMD,  since 
capacity augmentation during an outbreak is often impossible faced with the unexpected 
introduction of a fast-spreading disease. 
Potential constraints local decision makers may face during an FMD outbreak 
include  the  following.    First,  although  the  decision  makers  would  like  to  start 
implementing  control  policies  as  soon  as  the  disease  is  introduced  in  the  region,  the 
disease would not be detected immediately.  Second, on a given day, there may be more 
animals  that  the  decision  makers  would  wish  to  euthanatize  and  dispose  of  than  the 
region has the capacity to do so.  Third, vaccination scale would depend on the vaccine 
stockpile as well as vaccination manpower.  Fourth, manpower for enforcing movement 
restrictions would also affect the effectiveness. 
All  of  these  constraints  would  affect  disease  dynamics  differently,  and  there 
would be certain extent of substitutability and complementarity in investments intended 
for relaxing potential constraints.  For example, vaccination may relieve a bottleneck in 
carcass disposal capacity by slowing down disease spread and hence reducing the number 
of animals that need to be disposed of each day.  Alternatively, the bottleneck may be   11 
relieved by early disease detection achieved through routinely-implemented surveillance 
activities.  In making decisions about allocating resources to alternative investment areas 
in preparation for a potential FMD outbreak, understanding the disease dynamics and 
potential impacts of such investments on the disease dynamics is essential.  With the use 
of a dynamic optimization model, we address such questions and provide information 
useful for FMD management in California. 
The  US  has  been  free  of  FMD  since  1929  and  has  enjoyed  access  to  export 
markets  for  beef  and  other  livestock  commodities  without  facing  FMD-related 
restrictions.  However, the concerns over a potential FMD outbreak are rising, especially 
following  the  UK’s  experience  in  2001  and  an  elevated  threat  of  bio-terrorism  since 
September 11, 2001.  USDA and other federal and local agencies have conducted FMD 
simulation  exercises  (Riggs  and  Waldrup,  2000;  Speers  et  al.,  2004)  and  drafted 
emergency response guidelines (PL 107-9 Federal Inter-agency Working Group, 2003; 
CDFA, 2006).  According to these documents, vaccination decisions would be made at 
the federal level in case of an FMD outbreak in the US, and the option of “strategic 
vaccination” would be used if it is determined necessary and feasible.  The policy on 
whether to slaughter vaccinated animals after the outbreak is contained is unclear.  The 
official FMD vaccine stockpile is controlled at the federal level at the North American 
FMD Vaccine Bank.
10 
The  exact  federal  vaccination  strategy,  therefore,  would  be  specific  to  each 
outbreak.  Accordingly, local decision makers would have to make preparation decisions 
without knowing whether or not vaccination would be an option.  To reflect the situation, 
                                                 
10 Private international markets for FMD vaccine exist, and local governments could invest in their own 
vaccine stockpile.  We are not aware of such cases in the US.   12 
we analyze expected impacts of investments in surveillance efforts and carcass disposal 
capacity under different assumptions about vaccination policies.  In this study, we assume 
sufficient  manpower  to  implement  control  policies,  i.e.  manpower  for  euthanasia, 
vaccination, and enforcement of movement restrictions would not be a limiting factor. 
2.3 THREE-COUNTY CALIFORNIA OPTIMAL FMD MANAGEMENT MODEL 
In  evaluating  alternative  preparation  investment  policies,  we  use  a  dynamic 
optimization  model  previously  developed  by  Kobayashi  et  al.  (a).    The  model  is  a 
numerical implementation of a discrete-time optimal control problem of local decision 
makers, with the objective of minimizing total outbreak cost and subject to the disease-
dynamics equations of motion in Table 1.  The regional outbreak cost consists of: 1) 
value of slaughtered livestock assets for disease control, 2) direct costs of disease control 
measures (depopulation and vaccination), and 3) daily operational costs during outbreak 
that the local administration incurs (including costs of enforcing movement restrictions).  
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The model was parameterized for a three-county region in the Central Valley of 
California  (Fresno,  Kings,  and  Tulare  counties).    The  epidemiologic  parameters 
( ) i i ij s l b , ,  were  taken  from,  or  estimated  using  the  output  of,  an  FMD  epidemic 
simulation model developed for the same region (Bates, Thurmond, and Carpenter, 2003).  
The disease transmission rates βij were estimated with and without movement restrictions 
on animals and other vectors (e.g. humans and vehicles).  Disease control policies would 
be implemented as soon as the first case is discovered.  Thus, the reduced βij values are 
applied from the day the initial case is discovered until the end of the outbreak.   13 
The model treats six operation types (beef, dairy, swine, sheep and goat, backyard, 
and sales yards), and daily optimal strategies are solved for herds in each of the six types.  
Altogether 2,238 herds and 5 sales yards were identified in the three-county region (Bates, 
Thurmond, and Carpenter, 2003).  In this model, a sales yard is considered as a transitory 
destination, where animals do not stay for an extended period, and thus depopulation and 
vaccination policies are not applied to sales yards.  However, sales yards are considered 
to have an important role in disease dissemination, as they attract animals from various 
farms,  let  them  interact  and  have  direct  contacts,  and  then  send  them  off  to  various 
destinations.    Sales  yards  in  the  region  would  be  closed  as  soon  as  the  first  case  of 
infection is detected, thus in this model they do not contribute to disease transmission 
following the initial detection.  For backyard operations, preemptive depopulation and 
vaccination are not considered. 
The region houses about 1.8 million head of FMD-susceptible livestock (cattle, 
hogs,  sheep,  and  goats)  (NASS-USDA,  2004).    More  than  half  of  such  livestock 
population is dairy cattle (including milking cows and replacement heifers).  Beef cattle 
represent 31% of the total population, hogs 11%, and sheep and goats 4%.  The region is 
characterized by a concentrated distribution of large-scale dairy operations.  These dairy 
herds  are  considered  to  have  high  disease  transmission  rates  because  of  the  frequent 
movements  of  animals,  people,  and  vehicles  to  and  from  these  operations  (Bates, 
Thurmond, and Carpenter, 2001).  Dairy herds also have high asset values, and thus an 
FMD outbreak and subsequent depopulation control in the region are expected to cause 
disproportionate damage to the local dairy industry.  Selected model parameters are listed 
in Table 2.   14 
3.  EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE FMD PREPARATION POLICIES 
3.1 BENCHMARK MODEL RESULTS 
Kobayashi et al. (b) use the same model to analyze the optimal FMD control 
policies in the three-county region.  Here, we summarize their results and use them as the 
benchmark for our analyses on FMD preparation investments.  They run the model with 
and without vaccination, where vaccination scale is limited by the limited federal vaccine 
stockpile.
11  The model is run for a planning horizon of 100 days.  They initialize model 
runs  by  infecting  one  herd  (index  case)  on  the  first  day,  which  may  represent  an 
accidental introduction of FMD into the region.  The procedure is repeated for all six herd 
types.  All control measures including movement restrictions are implemented on day 21 
and after, the estimated lag between the initial infection and detection in the 2001 UK 
outbreak (Gibbens and Wilesmith, 2002). 
Kobayashi  et  al.  (b)  find  that  preemptive  slaughter  is  never  optimal  in  the 
modeled  environment.    It  would  cost  more  to  depopulate  herds  additional  to  those 
identified  infected,  even  though  doing  so  would  limit  potential  disease  spread.  
Vaccination is found never optimal under a vaccinate-to-kill policy, where vaccinated 
animals are subsequently slaughtered.  Vaccination is found to reduce the regional cost if 
a vaccinate-to-live policy is taken.  In this case, vaccination is applied only to dairy herds.  
Because  of  the  high  asset  value  of  dairy  cattle,  it  is  found  economically  efficient  to 
protect dairy herds from infection by vaccinating them. 
                                                 
11 They use estimates provided by the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (Speers et al., 2004).  It is 
estimated that 250,000 doses would arrive 4 days after control strategies are put in place (available for use 
on day 26); after 4 more days, 500,000 doses would arrive (available on day 30); a week later and every 
week after that, a million doses would arrive.   15 
The outbreak size and cost vary significantly by index-case herd types (Table 3).  
The outbreak is by far the longest, largest (in terms of total number of infected animals), 
and costliest, when it starts on a sales yard, followed by dairy, swine, and sheep and goat 
herds.  The outbreak is the least extensive when a beef or backyard herd is the index case.  
The results reflect the different rates of disease transmission across source and destination 
herd types, which are represented in the βij values.  For example, on a given day, a sales 
yard or a dairy herd likely has higher probabilities of both receiving and shipping out 
infectious  animals  than  an  extensive  beef  operation.    Vaccination  reduces  the  total 
regional cost, but its impact is substantial only when the index case is a sales yard.  The 
extent of vaccination (the number of animals vaccinated) also varies by index-case herd 
types. 
3.2 VALUE OF CARCASS DISPOSAL CAPACITY 
The base results predict that there would be 20-300 thousand head of animals to 
slaughter and dispose of during an FMD outbreak in the region.  The results assume an 
unlimited carcass disposal capacity, while there would be a capacity limitation in reality.  
During the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK, concerns were raised over various carcass 
disposal methods and their negative impacts on public health and environment (NAO, 
2002).  Should an FMD outbreak occur in the US, carcass disposal procedures would face 
a closer scrutiny (NABCC, 2004), which may result in limiting the scope and scale of 
resources available for carcass disposal. 
To  address  the  issue,  we  run  the  model  with  a  constraint  on  carcass  disposal 
capacity, where the number of animals that the three-county region can dispose of each   16 
day  is limited, while maintaining the other specifications.
12  Since clear  estimates on 
actual capacities in the region are unavailable, we consider a range from 4,000 head/day 
(5 head/hour, 16 hours/day, 50 sites) to 30,000 head/day, and associated shadow values 
are estimated.  The shadow values reported here are the sums of daily shadow values on 
carcass disposal capacity constraint over the entire duration of each outbreak.  The sign is 
then reversed to make the values positive (a larger capacity reduces the total cost, hence 
each  original  shadow  value  is  negative).    Note  that  the  number  of  clinically-infected 
animals on day 21 (Table 3) represents the number of animals that the local decision 
makers  would  like  to  dispose  of  on  the  day  FMD  is  first  confirmed  in  the  region.
13  
Without prior intervention, the demand for carcass disposal capacity is expected to be the 
greatest on day 21.  Since the figures for beef and backyard as the index-case herd type 
are below 4,000 head, it is expected that the capacity constraint would never bind for 
these cases. 
When  the  option  to  vaccinate  is  not  available,  the  shadow  values  differ 
substantially by index-case herd types (Figure 1).
14  The shadow values are by far the 
highest when the index case is a sales  yard.  An outbreak that starts in a sales  yard 
spreads  most  rapidly  and  extensively,  and  having  a  sufficient  capacity  to  control  the 
outbreak is most important in this case.  Note that the shadow values at low capacity 
levels are much smaller than the maximum (found at 13,000 head/day).  This is because 
                                                 
12 In Kobayashi et al. (b), it is found that, when the region faces a binding constraint in carcass disposal 
capacity, it is optimal to give priority to dairy herds.  That is, by depopulating and disposing of dairy herds 
before other herd types, additional infections, primarily of dairy herds, would be minimized. 
13 The  model  assumes  that  clinically-infected  herds  are  immediately  identified  once  the  first  case  is 
discovered. 
14 Because of the high complexity and non-linearity of the model, the numerical solutions are sometimes 
sensitive to the starting values, and the obtained solutions can contain local minima.  While the shadow 
values should monotonically decrease as the capacity expands, the results presented in the figures contain 
non-monotonic parts.  In such cases, one should be concerned about the trends.  Gaps between points 
(missing lines) represent extreme values and are not shown in the figures.   17 
the outbreak becomes so large
15 that marginal increases in capacity at such low capacity 
levels contribute minimally to a faster disease control and hence cost reduction.  The 
marginal benefit of additional carcass disposal capacity is especially high between 12,000 
and 15,000 head/day. 
The shadow values of carcass disposal are the second highest when a dairy herd is 
the index case (Figure 1).  Dairy herds are important as both the source and destination 
on disease transmission.  Once a dairy herd is infected, it quickly spreads to other dairy 
herds.  The shadow value declines rapidly as the capacity expands, and it practically 
becomes zero at 9,500 head/day.  As expected, when a beef or a backyard herd is the 
index case, the shadow values are zero for all capacity levels. 
When  a  vaccination  option  is  available  under  a  vaccinate-to-live  policy,  the 
shadow  values  are  much  lower  than  under  no-vaccination  policy  (Figure  2).    The 
vaccination  option  reduces  the  shadow  value  of  carcass  disposal  capacity  most 
dramatically when the index case is a sales yard: the highest shadow value declines from 
$632,874 without vaccination (found at 13,000 head/day) to $6,702 with vaccination (at 
7,000 head/day).  Again, the lower shadow values at the lower end of the capacity range 
suggest the difficulty in timely disease control when carcass disposal capacity is severely 
limited, even with the option of vaccination. 
Vaccinate-to-kill  policy,  where  vaccinated  animals  are  slaughtered  once  the 
outbreak is contained, is never optimal at the three-county level when a non-sales yard 
operation is the index case.  In these cases, even if a vaccination option is available, the 
advantage of vaccination in controlling the outbreak would not compensate additional 
                                                 
15 Practically all herds in the region would be infected.   18 
losses in the livestock assets, and the sole use of baseline depopulation would be more 
economical. 
A vaccinate-to-kill policy is optimal only when the index case is a sales yard and 
when the carcass disposal capacity is limited to below 18,000 head/day.  In these cases, 
even if additional animals have to be slaughtered, vaccination would limit the outbreak 
cost  lower  than  relying  only  on  depopulation.    Investigation  at  selected  capacity 
constraint levels suggests that, compared to under a vaccinate-to-live policy, the optimal 
number of animals to vaccinate under a vaccinate-to-kill policy is smaller, and it declines 
more quickly as the carcass disposal capacity expands.  The incentive for local decision 
makers under a vaccinate-to-kill policy is to vaccinate fewer animals as the necessity to 
vaccinate diminishes.  For larger capacity levels than 18,000 head/day, the solutions are 
essentially identical to the results under no-vaccination policy (Figure 3). 
The  examination  of  the  shadow  values  on  carcass  disposal  capacity  reveals 
several  important  policy  implications.    First,  a  limited  carcass  disposal  capacity  does 
affect the course of FMD control strategies, and this aspect needs to be considered in 
FMD preparation at the local level.  Especially, estimation of the existing capacity is 
essential in evaluating the regional preparedness to a potential FMD outbreak.  Second, 
local carcass disposal capacity and federal vaccination policies interact.  If the option to 
vaccinate  is  not  available,  having  sufficient  carcass  disposal  capacity  is  especially 
important. 
Third, the impacts of a limited carcass disposal capacity vary depending on where 
the outbreak starts, which determines the future disease spread and the eventual outbreak 
size.  If the outbreak was expected to start only on a beef or backyard herd, existing   19 
capacity might be sufficient.  On the other hand, it is estimated that, if a sales yard was 
the expected index case, a capacity below 12,000 head/day would result in infection of 
practically all herds in the region without vaccination.  In reality, it is uncertain where the 
outbreak would start.  There may be multiple index cases, which is especially likely in 
case of an intentional introduction of the disease into the region.  Therefore, decisions 
about desirable level of carcass disposal capacity may be made in reference to likely 
scenarios of disease introduction into the region and the associated probabilities. 
3.3 VALUE OF SURVEILLANCE 
The above analysis suggests that the three-county region of California may be 
better prepared for a potential FMD outbreak by strengthening carcass disposal capacity.  
Such capacity may have some alternative usage, including outbreaks of other livestock 
diseases that involve slaughter and disposal of animals (e.g. avian influenza and Exotic 
Newcastle disease).  However, the scope of alternative usage of the capacity would be 
limited, and a large capacity would not be necessary for many of the scenarios for an 
FMD outbreak in the region.  Thus, investment in a large carcass disposal capacity may 
not be unanimously supported by decision makers. 
We argue that investing in a targeted routine surveillance as well as in a moderate 
carcass  disposal  capacity  would  be  an  alternative  strategy  to  prepare  for  an  FMD 
outbreak.    Surveillance  activities  would  enable  early  disease  detection  and  early 
implementation of movement restrictions and other control policies, which in turn would 
relieve a bottleneck of carcass disposal capacity in a large outbreak.  There are several 
potential surveillance techniques that differ in terms of the sensitivity and report-time 
specifications  and  in  the  implementation  and  running  costs.    For  instance,  the   20 
Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) provides timely and accurate results, 
sometimes within 15 minutes (Fitch, Raber, and Imbro, 2003), but it is estimated to cost 
$15,000  per  unit  (The  Athena  Project)  and  requires  a  continuous  and  high  level  of 
maintenance. 
The substitutability between investments in carcass disposal capacity and routine 
surveillance are illustrated in the iso-cost curves (Figures 4 and 5).  The model is used to 
generate  total  outbreak  cost
16 under  1,115  different  combinations  of  carcass  disposal 
capacity  and  surveillance  level.    We  assume  no  vaccination  and  either  a  sales  yard 
(Figure 4) or a dairy herd (Figure 5) is specified as the index case, since the bottleneck of 
a  carcass  disposal  capacity  constraint  would  be  the  tightest  in  these  cases.    For 
surveillance, we consider a generic technique that reduces the duration between the index 
case and detection.  We consider a range of detection lag between zero days (immediate 
detection) to 28 days.  Note that the detection lag thus far assumed in the analysis is 21 
days. 
The figures confirm the existence of substitutability.  For example, when a sales 
yard is the index case (Figure 4), for the iso-cost curve for 800 million dollars, detecting 
the disease half a week earlier (as opposed to on day 21) would result in the same cost 
saving effect as augmenting the carcass disposal capacity from about 8,000 to 14,500 
head/day.  To achieve the same outbreak cost under unlimited carcass disposal capacity 
($458.4 million, Table 3) with a low level of carcass disposal capacity of say, 5,000 
head/day, the detection lag would have to be shortened by a week.  This may be possible 
with a different technology or with more frequent testing with the same technology. 
                                                 
16 Costs  of  investment  in  carcass  disposal  capacity  or  surveillance  activities  are  not  included  in  the 
calculation.   21 
Our  earlier  results  suggest  that  surveillance  activities  may  be  appropriately 
targeted  for  sales  yards  in  the  region,  as  they  are  expected  to  act  as  the  major 
disseminators of the virus.  Alternatively, dairy farms may be a desirable surveillance 
target, as proportionately more dairy herds would be infected in the region and a higher 
detection rate would be achieved if the surveillance system would be installed only on 
selected farms.  Targeting dairy herds would also be desirable because the surveillance 
system could serve for early detection of subsequent cases, whereas all sales yards would 
be closed and the system would not be utilized after the first case is detected in the region. 
Results of the FMD simulation model (Bates, Thurmond, and Carpenter, 2003), 
with which the optimization model used in this paper was parameterized, sugges that 
implementation of the above mentioned air-“sniffer” device (APDS) in the region has a 
potential of relieving the carcass disposal capacity bottleneck in the region (Dr. Bradley 
Dickey, CADMS, personal communication).  According to the simulation results, for 
example, installing APDS at all of the five sales yards in the region, with continuous 
monitoring, would allow average disease detection on day 18 rather than on day 21.  The 
unit  cost  of  implementation  would  be  $15,000  (The  Athena  Project),  and  the  annual 
maintenance cost is estimated to be around $10,000 (JASON, 2003). 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Using a previously developed dynamic optimization model (Kobayashi et al., a), 
we  analyze  the  impacts  of  alternative  preparation  investments  on  potential  FMD 
outbreaks in the three-county region in the Central Valley of California.  Given different 
assumptions about federal vaccination policies, we estimate the cost-saving effects of 
investments in different levels of carcass disposal capacity and surveillance efforts.  We   22 
find that a limitation in carcass disposal capacity would affect the feasible set of FMD 
control  strategies  in  the  region.    The  impacts  of  the  capacity  constraint  would  vary 
depending on where the first infection occurs, which affects the extent of disease spread 
and  the  eventual  outbreak  size.    While  additional  carcass  disposal  capacity  may  not 
provide benefit if a beef or a backyard herd is the index case, cost savings would be 
substantial if an outbreak starts on a sales yard and, to a lesser degree, on a dairy herd. 
We  also  find  substitutability  between  investments  in  carcass  disposal  capacity 
augmentation and surveillance activity.  The carcass disposal bottleneck could be relieved 
by routine surveillance activity targeted at sales yards (and possibly dairy farms) via early 
disease detection and early implementation of control strategies.  While carcass disposal 
capacity would have limited alternative uses, surveillance equipments may be calibrated 
for detecting other diseases and pathogens.  Our results do not include values of such 
alternative  uses  of  the  capacities.    With  these  included,  a  higher  overall  value  of 
surveillance efforts is expected. 
Another important finding is the strong interactions between depopulation and 
vaccination policies especially when the carcass disposal capacity is limited.  Without a 
vaccination option, local disease control policy would have to depend on depopulation, 
which increases the burden on the carcass disposal capacity.  In the current federal policy, 
whether  or  not  vaccination  is  available  would  be  determined  case  by  case  and  thus 
unknown prior to an outbreak.  Thus, the incentive of local decision makers may be to 
prepare the region for a potential FMD outbreak with a sufficient capacity of carcass 
disposal capacity and routine surveillance activities.  Alternatively, local decision makers 
may  wish  to  secure  their  own  vaccine  stockpile.    With  a  potential  of  local  FMD   23 
vaccination resulting in trade restrictions applied at the national level, coordination of 
vaccination policies at different decision-making levels would be appropriate. 
The  optimization  model  used  in  this  study  is  a  unique  combination  of 
epidemiology  and  economic  concepts  and  techniques.    The  model  enables  economic 
analyses  based  on  reasonably  detailed  disease  dynamics  that  are  locally  and  disease 
specific.    Shadow  values  on  limited  resources  and  substitutability  of  alternative 
investment areas suggested by the model are crucial for informed decision making in 
preparation for potential FMD outbreaks.  The approach is readily applicable to other 
diseases, especially where data on actual outbreaks are available or where a sophisticated 
epidemiologic simulation model is developed. 
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Table 1. Daily FMD Disease Dynamics 
  Prevalence (Stock)  Incidence (Flow) 
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Notes: 
ij b : disease transmission rate from herd type i to herd type j 
i l : duration of latent period 
i s : duration of subclinically-infectious period 
B
it r : rate of baseline slaughter (depopulation of clinically-infected herds) 
P
it r : rate of preemptive slaughter 
it n : vaccination rate 
Source: Kobayashi et al. (a).   29 























Herd type (i)  (herd)  (head/herd)  ($/head)  ($/head)  ($/herd)  ($/head)  ($/herd) 
Beef  664  853  598  16.5  9,513
  6  885 
Dairy  576  1,727  1,669  16.5  31,710
  6  664 
Swine  79  2,519  130  16.5  9,513
  6  664 
Sheep and goat  131  558  121  16.5  9,513
  6  885 
Backyard  788  5  0  16.5  5,000
  na  na 
Sales yard  5  na
  na  na  31,710
  na  na 
na: Not applicable 
Source: Kobayashi et al. (a).   30 
Table 3. Summary Results of Optimal FMD Management by Index Case Herd Type 
(No carcass disposal capacity constraint) 
  Index case: 
  Beef  Dairy  Swine  Sheep/ 
goat 
 
Backyard  Sales yard 
Total regional cost (million dollars) 
No vaccination  38.7  113.1  87.8  83.8  33.4  458.4 
Vaccination  37.3  106.1  82.6  79.2  32.3  424.3 
Outbreak duration (days) 
No vaccination  38  44  43  42  37  52 
Vaccination  35  38  37  38  34  38 
Number of clinically-infected animals on day 21 (000 head) 
  2.7  13.2  8.9  6.5  1.8  75.1 
Total number of infected animals for the entire outbreak (000 head) 
No vaccination  24.2  71.8  57.8  53.6  20.2  301.2 
Vaccination  22.6  66.0  53.3  49.5  18.8  277.6 
Total number of animals vaccinated (000 head) 
  250.0  518.7  434.4  397.8  250.0  720.5   31 
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Figure 3. Shadow value of carcass disposal capacity by policy: Index case sales yard   34 
 
Figure 4. Iso-cost curves (Million dollars, Index case sales yard, No vaccination) 
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Figure 5. Iso-cost curves (Million dollars, Index case dairy, No vaccination)  
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